保罗·拉赫｜土耳其不再是西方世界的一部分？

传达者

保罗·拉赫｜土耳其不再是西方世界的一部分？

                                                                                                   

• 本文译自胡佛研究所（7月31日）
• 英文标题：Is Turkey no longer part of the West ?
• 作者保罗·拉赫（Paul Rahe），美国希尔斯代尔学院历史学教授
• 译文约2700字，英文原文见文末的“阅读原文”
  
  
  

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大约100年前，奥斯曼帝国土崩瓦解，穆斯塔法·凯末尔在帝国的废墟上建立起现代土耳其国。20年前，还没有哪个西方人会质疑他的成就，此人最终将自己塑造成“阿塔图尔克”（注释：Atatürk，意即“土耳其人之父”），这个称呼可以说名至实归。现如今，很多人担心他本人在1920年代发起的政治、文化革命被颠覆，土耳其将不再是一个正常的民族国家，转而与西方世界对立，并试图颠覆东地中海地区、巴尔干半岛和中东地区的现有秩序。

作为政治家，阿塔图尔克的抱负令人惊叹。他希望按照欧洲模式将奥斯曼帝国的残余疆土重建成一个民族国家，这需要将安纳托利亚的人口与奥斯曼帝国欧洲领土的人口，整合进一个新的、与传统伊斯兰不相容的陌生世界。为达到这一目的，他陆续废除了苏丹职位（Sultanate）、哈里发（Caliphate）、宗教事务部以及宗教学校。

他把法兰西第三共和国视为样板，将宗教限制在私人领域，约束逊尼派信徒，并建立起世俗学校。他清除土耳其语中的阿拉伯语借词，用拉丁字母替代了一直使用的波斯-阿拉伯字母。他废除宗教法庭，并以瑞士、意大利、法国、德国的法典为原型，建立起一套法律体系，取代了伊斯兰教法（shariah）。他压制宗教兄弟会、禁止土耳其毡帽（fez）、允许女性进入公共领域。他解放了她们，确保女孩和男孩在学校接受相同的课程，并鼓励她们就业。与此同时，他在职权范围之内竭尽所能鼓励他新共和国的人民首先认同自己是土耳其人而非穆斯林。

阿塔图尔克在一个问题上失败了。伊斯兰教的复原能力强（resilient）。每当他允许或者鼓励引入竞争性政党政治，其中某个党派就会滑向传统伊斯兰教，有两次他不得不重回一党统治。“二战”之后，他亲选的接班人Ismet Inönü在美国的压力下重复了这个实验，并于1950年开始真正意义上的自由选举，然而，先前的故事又一次上演，这种倾向导致接下来的50年强硬的凯末尔派军人频频干预公共生活。

不过，20世纪的最后20年，凯末尔派逐渐退让，寄希望于与伊斯兰教和解。新的清真寺拔地而起，培训宗教教师的学校数量激增，当局对种种宗教兄弟会势力的返潮视而不见。1980年代图尔古特·厄扎尔（Turgut Özal）当政时，穆斯林的虔诚（Muslim piety）一度看似能与世俗政治以及凯末尔主义者的抱负——即土耳其加入欧洲成为西方世界的一部分——达成和解。

但是，由于中右政党的弊政与腐败，加之90年代困扰土耳其的一系列经济衰退，再加上2001年中右政党联盟推行的不得人心的财政紧缩政策，结果，2002年11月新成立的“正义与发展党”（AKP）得到了超过三分之一的选票——由于宪法条款禁止得票不足10%的小政党进入议会，正义与发展党不出所料成为议会中的绝对多数派。雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安与阿卜杜拉·居尔——他们曾是强硬派伊斯兰福利党的支持者——领导下的正义与发展党，将自己包装成同情伊斯兰、反对腐败、支持自由市场、支持土耳其入欧盟谈判的温和党派；有几年时间，它确实秉承这些理念执政，经济在一定时期得到了快速发展，他们也赢得了一场又一场的选举。

不过，随着时间推移，在正义与发展党悄然转向伊斯兰路线的同时，埃尔多安也将大权揽入手中。他精于施展萨拉米策略（salami tactic，注释：亦称切香肠战术、渐进战术，是一种以结盟、威胁来分化、征服的政治和军事手段），擅长利用敌意来分化同胞。一开始，他给中右的反对党“去势”。之后，在土耳其自由派以及极具个人魅力的宗教领袖法土拉·葛兰（Fethullah Gülen）的坚定支持下，他震慑住一直主导行政机关、法院、军队的凯末尔派，随后将其驱逐出公共生活。此后，他抛弃自由派，并镇压大多数反对派媒体。最后，他将居尔以及党内其它对手边缘化；粉碎并清洗昔日的盟友——葛兰运动的参与者；最终促成宪法的修改，将土耳其改造为总统制共和国。如今，6月24日当选使他成为全新的总统，现在的埃尔多安俨然是一位独裁者——一位新奥斯曼苏丹，大权独揽、一言九鼎、不容置疑，置身于国家（近年来成为世界经济强国与一支重要力量）之巅。

毋庸置疑，土耳其与昔日的欧洲和北美的伙伴的关系会一直很僵。埃尔多安不知收敛，喜欢仗势欺人。而且，他乐于欺凌欧洲人，招惹美国人。在国际舞台上，他把自己标榜为各国穆斯林的守护者。在阿拉伯世界，他向穆斯林兄弟会提供援助。他与伊朗的毛拉们（mullah）以及俄国的普京过从甚密。此外，凭借64岁的年龄，他依然可以在政坛上活跃10到15年——甚至更长的时间，就像有人推测的那样——从而进一步扭转阿塔图尔克发起的革命。

埃尔多安已经在学校和高等学府向这个国家的年轻人灌输传统伊斯兰的教条。他可能会取缔酒类的生产和销售，禁止女性与异性跳舞。他可能会将土耳其的世俗化知识分子驱逐出境；并在2023年，在废除哈里发（Caliphate）的100周年，他有可能恢复这个制度并亲自任职。尽管如此，这里仍然有一些约束因素。

我怀疑伊斯兰教法（shariah）会重新成为土耳其的法律，阿拉伯字母会替代拉丁字母、女生会被学校开除、女性被驱逐出公共领域。这样的剧变超出了埃尔多安的能力。近一半的土耳其人痛恨他们的新苏丹，而且，土耳其已经是一个中产阶级国家，国民普遍识字。由于对国际经济的依赖，它受到的外界影响正与日俱增；如果生活方式被严苛地干预，年轻的土耳其人也会不耐烦。

土耳其还面临地缘政治的限制。它位于世界上危险的、动荡地带，东边需要对付库尔德人的暴动，在埃尔多安任内，这种形势愈发严峻。此外，虽然它的邻国非常乐见土耳其与它的北约盟友反目，但是他们的野心与埃尔多安并不相容。由于逊尼派－什叶派之间的分歧，伊朗和土耳其两国的伊斯兰主义者最终会剑拔弩张。俄罗斯是土耳其的宿敌。与土耳其东部接壤的逊尼派阿拉伯世界向来是一个泥潭。埃尔多安有可能将自己幻想成伊斯兰信徒的大统领，但是土耳其以外的穆斯林并不会接受他的指挥。他所掌管的国家日益受到孤立，这个国家也没有必要的资金来单干——尤其是土耳其的经济高度依赖境外投资和外贸。埃尔多安在土耳其境外的几乎所有野心都可能以失败告终。

很显然，死亡是最终的限制。埃尔多安不太可能自愿离职。但是死神某一天定会降临，而土耳其的文化和政治是父权制的。除了阿塔图尔克的共和人民党（Republican Peoples  Party），没有哪个政党在主心骨死后还能幸存下来。埃尔多安退出历史舞台的时候，会出现一个空缺。此时，会有一个机会，一个纠正过程。土耳其人如今不是从来也不是奴隶，这位新苏丹早晚会超出他们的耐性。除非伊斯兰教果真是答案，那么，阿塔图尔克所开启的现代化之路，在未来的一些年会变得愈发具有吸引力。而埃尔多安选择的另一条道路一定会将困扰中东其它国家几个世纪的病变重新带回土耳其。

               

传达者

Is Turkey No Longer Part Of The West?


by Paul Rahe
Tuesday, July 31, 2018

Image credit:
Poster Collection, Cairo Punch 00131, Hoover Institution Archives.

Almost a century has passed since the Ottoman Empire was dismembered and Mustafa Kemal set out to build the modern Turkish state on its ruins. Twenty years ago, no one in the West would have called into question the achievement of the man who eventually, with considerable justice, styled himself Atatürk (“Father of the Turks”). But many now fear that the political and cultural revolution he instigated in the 1920s will be overturned and that Turkey will cease to function as normal nation state, turn on the West, and try to upend the existing order in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

Atatürk’s ambition as a statesman was breathtaking. He wanted to reconfigure what was left of the Ottoman Empire as a nation state on the European model, and this required that he drag the population of Anatolia and of what remained of the Ottoman Empire’s European holdings into a new and unfamiliar world incompatible with traditional Islam. To this end, he effected the abolition of Sultanate, then the Caliphate, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the religious schools. Taking the Third Republic of France as a model, he confined religion to the private sphere, put Sunni Islam on a leash, and instituted secular schools. He purged Turkish of Arabic loans words and substituted for the Perso-Arabic script hitherto employed the Latin alphabet. He abolished the religious courts, and, in place of the shariah, he established a legal system modelled on the law codes of Switzerland, Italy, France, and Germany. He suppressed the religious brotherhoods, outlawed the fez, and he brought women into the public sphere. He enfranchised them, saw to it that there was a common curriculum in the schools for both girls and boys, and encouraged their entry into the professions. At the same time, he did everything within his power to encourage the people of his new republic to think of themselves first and foremost as Turks, not Muslims.

Atatürk failed in one particular. Islam was resilient. Every time that he allowed or encouraged the introduction of competitive party politics, one of the parties drifted in the direction of traditional Islam, and on two separate occasions he found himself forced to return to one-party rule. When his hand-picked successor Ismet Inönü repeated the experiment under American pressure after World War II and genuinely free elections began to take place in 1950, the same development took place, and over the next fifty years this propensity led to repeated interventions in public life by Turkey’s fiercely Kemalist military.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, however, the Kemalist establishment gradually gave ground in the hopes of reaching an accommodation with Islam. New mosques were built, the schools set up to train religious teachers were greatly expanded in number, and a blind eye was turned the resurgence staged by the religious brotherhoods. For a time, in the 1980s when Turgut Özal dominated Turkish politics, it looked as if Muslim piety could be reconciled with secular politics and the Kemalist aspiration that Turkey join Europe and become part of the West.

But in November 2002—thanks to misgovernment and corruption on the part of the center-right parties, to a series of recessions that bedeviled Turkey in the 1990s, and to an unpopular austerity program imposed on the country by a center-right coalition in 2001—the newly founded Justice and Development Party (AKP) received more than one-third of the votes—which, thanks to a constitutional provision barring from the assembly splinter parties with under 10% of the vote, unexpectedly gave it a commanding majority in Turkey’s parliament. Led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, who had been adherents of the hardline Islamist Welfare Party, the AKP presented itself as a moderate party sympathetic to Islam, hostile to corruption, committed to free markets, and intent on negotiating Turkey’s entrance into the European Union; and for some years it governed in this spirit, fueling a period of rapid economic growth and winning one election after another.

As time passed, however, the AKP moved unobtrusively in an Islamist direction while Erdoğan concentrated power in his own hands. The man was a brilliant practitioner of salami tactics with a gift for exploiting the antagonisms that had come to divide his compatriots. At the outset, he neutered the opposition parties of the center right. Thereafter, with firm support from Turkish liberals and from the adherents of the charismatic religious teacher Fethullah Gülen, he cowed the Kemalists who had hitherto dominated the bureaucracy, the courts, and the military, then drove them from public life. Thereafter, he discarded the liberals and suppressed much of the opposition press. And, finally, he sidelined Gül and his other rivals in the AKP; crushed, then purged his onetime allies in the Gülenist movement; and secured constitutional changes that transformed Turkey into a presidential republic. Now, thanks to his election on 24 June to that republic’s transformed presidency, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a virtual dictator—a neo-Ottoman Sultan, authorized to rule by decree, who is unchallenged and unchallengeable, perched atop a country that in recent decades has become an economic powerhouse and a force in the world.

There can be no doubt that relations between Turkey and its erstwhile partners in Europe and on the North American continent will continue to be prickly, as they have been for some time. Erdoğan’s self-regard knows few limits, and he enjoys throwing his weight around. Moreover, he takes delight in bullying the Europeans and in sticking a finger in the eye of the Americans. On the world stage, he parades as the defender of Muslims everywhere. Within the Arab world, he provides support to the Muslim Brotherhood. He plays footsie with the mullahs of Iran and with Vladimir Putin of Russia. And, at 64, he is apt to be around for at least ten to fifteen years—long enough, some suppose, to allow him to reverse the revolution wrought by Atatürk.

There are, however, constraints. Erdoğan is already using Turkey’s schools and universities to indoctrinate the country’s young in the rubrics of traditional Islam. He may outlaw the production and sale of alcohol and prohibit women from dancing with men. He may force Turkey’s secularist intelligentsia into exile; and in 2023, on the hundredth anniversary of its abolition, he may well restore the Caliphate and assume the office himself.

I doubt, however, that in Turkey shariah will once again become the law of the land, that Arabic script will replace the Latin alphabet, and that girls will be expelled from the schools and women will be driven from the public sphere. Such an upheaval is beyond Erdoğan’s capacity. Almost half of his compatriots hate their new Sultan, and Turkey is now a middle-class land characterized by universal literacy. Thanks to its dependence on the global economy, it is increasingly open to outside influences; and young Turks are apt to become restive if too severe a regimen is imposed.

Turkey also faces geopolitical constraints. It is situated in a dangerous and unstable corner of the world, and in the east it is faced with a Kurdish insurrection that has worsened on Erdoğan’s watch. Moreover, although its neighbors are happy to play the Turks against their NATO allies, their ambitions are incompatible with those of Erdoğan. Thanks to the Sunni-Shiite divide, the Islamic revivalists in Iran and those in Turkey will eventually be at daggers drawn. Russia has always been Turkey’s enemy. And the Sunni Arab world ranged along much of Turkey’s eastern border is a quagmire. Erdoğan may fancy himself the Commander of the Faithful, but the faithful outside Turkey are not going to accept his command. The country he leads is increasingly isolated, and it does not have the wherewithal to go it alone—especially since the Turkish economy is highly dependent on investment from abroad and on foreign trade. Almost anything ambitious that Erdoğan attempts beyond Turkey’s borders is likely to end in tears.

Mortality is, of course, the ultimate constraint. Erdoğan is most unlikely to exit the scene voluntarily. But the grim reaper will some day present himself, and Turkish culture and politics is patriarchal. Apart from Atatürk’s Republican Peoples Party, no Turkish party has ever survived the demise of its presiding spirit. There will be an opening when Erdoğan is ushered off the stage. There will be an opportunity, and there will be a correction of course. The Turks are not now and never have been a servile lot, and their new Sultan is almost certain to overstay his welcome. Unless Islam really is the answer, the path to modernity charted by Atatürk is apt in the years to come to look more and more attractive. The alternative chosen by Erdoğan is bound to re-introduce into Turkey the pathologies that have for centuries beset the rest of the Middle East.

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