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撒切尔夫人|欧洲的政治架构

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发表于 2018-9-11 19:49:17 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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撒切尔夫人|欧洲的政架构


                                                                                                   

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按:本文为撒切尔夫人1992年在荷兰海牙的政治演说(Speech in the Hague),又称为“欧洲的政治架构”(Europe’s Political Architecture)。在演讲中,撒切尔夫人回顾了欧共体(欧盟前身)的起源,德国问题在欧洲政治史上的重要地位,以及美国的军事存在对欧洲均势的意义,更重要的是,早在1992年,她就洞察到欧共体内部的两条路线之争(简单说即超民族的中央集权的联盟vs.主权国家的、去中心化的松散联合),并明确指出欧洲一体化的问题所在。作为英国保守党“疑欧派”(Eurosceptics)的代表,撒切尔夫人的这篇演讲对我们理解英国的脱欧大有裨益。本文由 马红邑 译,万吉庆 校,译文全文约11400字。本文为摘录版,约6000字。英文原文见文末的“阅读原文”。

………………………

主席先生,我们现在的欧共体是在形势迥异、应付迥然不同的问题时创立的。

鉴于近来的形势,我们不得不质疑它所反映的政治思想和经济理论。

今天我就要做这件事。我打算回答三个问题。

首先,我们如何妥善应对德国的重新统一和复兴所造成的欧洲失衡?
第二,我们如何改革欧洲体制,使其适应后共产主义时代欧洲的多样性,并实现真正的民主?
第三,我们如何确保新欧洲有助于(而非破坏)世界的经济繁荣和政治稳定?
问题的答案不应倚赖上世纪四五十年代传统的集体主义智慧。

那是昨日的未来。

我们必须借鉴过去十年间席卷世界的自由、民主、自由市场和民族国家的理念。

欧共体的起源
我们现在接手的欧共体,是在与今天的形势大不相同的情况下建立的。

丘吉尔在1946年以其特有的宽宏大量,在苏黎世演讲中主张,德国应通过他所谓的“欧盟”,即“法、德之间的联合”走上正轨。

这不可能一蹴而就,而且需要美国的领导。

在1947年的寒冬,时任美国国务卿马歇尔在遍访欧洲之后,提出了援助的想法。

(援助的)原动力是为了欧洲的复苏。

它在很大程度上要归于美国人单纯的善意。

某种程度上,也基于商业算计——在自由贸易的环境下,欧洲的繁荣也是美国的繁荣。

但最主要的,是为了应对斯大林的威胁。

东欧的情况表明,意志消沉的民族无法抗拒共产党人的接管,马歇尔计划则旨在帮助西欧重新站稳脚跟。

这是一个巨大的成功。1945年时,谁能料想到1951年,从战败和毁灭中走出来的德国居然比英国的出口额还多?

但我们一再发现,为特定问题设置的机构,反而成为解决新问题的障碍——甚至它们本身就成了问题所在。

德国问题

主席先生,首先让我谈谈德国统一带来的新形势。

请允许我说,如果今天我是一位德国人,我会感到骄傲——骄傲但忧虑。

我会为德国的辉煌成就——如国家的重建、民主的巩固以及在欧洲取得的不容置疑的领先地位——而骄傲。但我也会担心欧洲共同体及其发展方向。

一个重新统一的德国不能、也不会无限期将自己的经济利益或外交政策服从于欧共体的利益。

然而,无论做得好与坏,德国新的卓越地位都是一个既定事实。

不过,德国的实力确实是个问题——对德国人和欧洲其余国家都是如此。
德国太大了,以至于无法成为欧洲(权力)游戏中的一个普通玩家,但是,它又没有强大到对邻国建立起不容置疑的霸权。
1870年以来的欧洲史,很大程度上就是为了找到遏制德国的适当架构。
作为德国的邻国,法国对这一点看得最清。

1929年的白里安,以及“二战”后的舒曼都提议建立经济联盟来实现这一目标。

白里安提议时正值纳粹崛起,后者使这一高瞻远瞩的计划流产,最后宣告失败。但舒曼关于欧共体的愿景之所以实现,得益于一系列非常独特的有利环境。
苏联的威胁使欧洲的合作势在必行。
德国本身是分裂的。
西方其他国家寻求德国参与西欧的防卫。
西德需要北约和欧洲共同体能给予的声望。
而且,美国在欧洲的存在和领导也减少了德国邻国的担忧。
但随着苏联的解体和德国的统一,整个形势发生了变化。
一个大约由30个国家组成的新欧洲正在形成,德国的权力问题再次浮出水面,政治家们争先恐后地提出解决办法。

起初,法国希望战后法国主导的法德伙伴关系能够延续下去。(德国的)科尔总理与戈尔巴乔夫单独而成功的谈判,很快就证明这是一种幻想。

法国和其他欧洲国家接下来的反应是,寻求将这个德国巨人限制在欧共体的联合决策范围内。然而,事实将很快证明,这也是幻想。

德国在欧共体的优势是如此明显,以至于任何重大决定都不能真正地违背德国的意愿。
在这种情况下,欧共体增强而非遏制了德国的力量。

请允许我用两个例子——其中本人支持德国的立场——来说明这一点。

第一个,我在前面已经提到,德国承认克罗地亚和斯洛文尼亚的决定,这迫使欧洲其他国家跟进。

第二,尽管受到七国集团一些国家的敦促,德国央行仍然拒绝执行轻率的财政政策。

无论我多么赞同这些政策,一个显而易见的事实是,德国遵循了自己的利益,而非听从邻国的建议,这些邻国随后被迫调整自己的立场。

均势

由此而言,可以最好地容纳德国权力的欧洲是一个更为松散的欧洲,其中,各民族国家保留行动的自由。

如果德国或任何其他强国执行一种为其他国所反对的政策,它就会自动触发一个反对它的联盟。

最终的解决方案将反映出对手的相对实力。

然而,(欧共体)共同的外交政策很容易反映最有实力的玩家的利益。

受困于共同外交政策的欧共体成员国的严重争端将引发危机,牵连共同体涵盖的一切事宜。

这里的普遍悖论是,过于雄心勃勃的合作尝试,很可能会制造冲突。

如果欧洲各国仍然有空间作出自己的决定并遵循自身利益行事——就像在海湾战争中那样——那么我们将会建立起更加和谐的关系。

但是,否认这种均势是毫无意义的。平衡有时会被打破并导致战争。欧洲自身无论多么有组织,仍然发现德国的权力问题是无解的。

欧洲真正享有稳定,始于美国成为欧洲的一支势力。
因此,第三种回应是保持美国在欧洲的存在。
美国的实力如此强大,足以使任何一个欧洲国家相形见绌。
过去,面对苏联强权,美国向欧洲国家提供了安全保证;如今,对于德国的崛起,它又发挥了类似的作用——德国人对此也心领神会。
为什么我们不担心美国会滥用权力呢?我们很难为一个不愿意滥用权势的大国而焦虑,相反,我们最担心的是美军撤离欧洲。
这就是问题所在。

美国国内有一种要求撤出欧洲的孤立主义观点。

它同样也被欧共体内部的类似想法激发和鼓励:即经济保护主义和“小欧洲”的政策。

在贸易方面,在关贸总协定的谈判上,在北约的结构调整上,我们需要奉行这样的政策,说服美国继续作为一支欧洲力量。

自由与民主的欧洲

如果需要美国来维护欧洲的安全,那么维持欧洲的自由和民主需要什么?

欧共体创始人在起草《罗马条约》时,借鉴了两种截然不同的经济传统的特点。
他们从自由主义中借鉴了自由贸易、自由市场和竞争。
他们从社会主义(伪装成社会天主教和社团主义)中学到了管制和干预。
30年来,直到《单一欧洲法案》(注释:1986年2月由欧共体理事会签署。主要内容:在1992年年底前实现商品、资本、劳务、人员自由流动的统一大市场)签署前,这两种传统一直处于无休止的、不被承认的紧张状态。

如今,随着理事会利用《单一欧洲法案》累积了更大的指导权和管制权——欧洲到了必须在两种方式中做出抉择的地步。
它是否会成为一个严格管控的、中央集权化的官僚主义联邦政府,并在整个欧洲大陆实施统一的标准?
或者,它是否会成为一个主权国家构成的松散的、去中心化的自由市场的欧洲,建立在一个自由贸易区内部不同国家税收和监管体系相互竞争的基础之上?

至少德洛尔先生(注释:时任欧共体委员会主席)似乎很清楚。

欧委会主席的雄心向来坦率得令人敬佩,甚至在《马斯特里赫特条约》的墨迹未干之前,他就在为该委员会寻求更多的资金和权力,该委员会或将成为共同体的行政机构,换言之,一个欧洲政府。

除这一条约之外,还发出一个倡议来满足委员会对共同体“单一制度结构”的要求。

因此,毫无疑问,欧委会主席追求的是一个高度中央集权的欧洲联邦国家。

他迫切地推动联邦主义事业也没有什么神秘可言。

尽管他可能希望推迟因东欧国家加入带来的欧共体的“扩大”,但他也意识到这是不可能的。

苏联将暴政强加给半个欧洲是一回事;布鲁塞尔压制半个欧洲将是一场道德灾难,它会剥夺欧共体在欧洲的合法性。

委员会知道,未来数十年内,它将不得不接纳新成员。

但它希望提前建立一个中央集权化的——而且是不可逆的——超大国,这样新成员国将不得不按照联邦制的条款申请加入。

与其说,这是建造一个共同的欧洲家园,倒不如说是一个共同的欧洲监狱。

而且这是不可能的。

想象一个由30个国家组成的欧洲共同体,其中,从德国到乌克兰的经济生产率各不相同,从英国到波兰的政治稳定程度各不一致(却要求它们):

  • 全部由布鲁塞尔管理;
  • 强制执行相同的工作条件;
  • 所有国家执行与德国工会相同的工人权利;
  • 利率、货币、财政和经济政策完全一致;
  • 共同的外交和国防政策全部达成一致;
  • 接受同一个行政机关和同一个遥远的外国议会(由其负责“80%的经济和社会立法”)的权威。


主席先生,这样的一个机构比巴别塔更像是乌托邦。

巴别塔的建造者至少在开始时还说着同一种语言。

主席先生,欧委会提议背后的思想,实质上反映的是“昨日的未来”。

那是“二战”后,欧洲最优秀的头脑在废墟中看到的未来。

但他们犯了一个重大的知识错误。

他们认为,未来的政府模式是一个中央集权化的官僚机构,它向上汇总信息,由高层做出决策,然后向下发号施令。
这种1945年的智慧,实际上是一个非常原始的谬误。

对小型企业来说,等级官僚制可能是应对外部激烈竞争的适当的组织方法,但它在几乎所有情况下,都是导致停滞和低效的因素。

比起市场所发现的,以及照此行事的信息,它(注释:官僚制)只能搜集和运用很有限的信息,因此它搞错了。
上层不能确定它的命令是否能够被底层执行。
而且,作为一个整体,该组织没有任何反馈机制来表明它执行得是好是坏。
然而,在一个政府中,它们造成了我们在共产主义下看到的经济混乱和异化。

这种遥远的、中央集权的、官僚主义的组织模式,正是欧洲委员会及其联邦主义支持者试图强加给欧共体的模式。虽然他们也承认,共同体可能很快就会接纳政治和经济发展水平程度不一、说着15种以上语言的国家。

“这很棒,但这不是政治。”

欧洲越大,它需要的合作形式就必须更加多样化。这种模式不应是一个中央集权的官僚机构,而应该是一个市场模式:不仅仅是由个人和公司组成的市场,而且还是一个由政府参与者构成的市场。

因此,各国政府将通过降低税收和减少管制,争相招徕外国投资、高级管理人员和高收入者。

这种市场将对政府施加财政约束,因为它们不想赶走专业技能和商业。

它还有助于确定哪些财政和监管政策能够带来最好的总体经济效果。

难怪社会主义者不喜欢它。

当然,要使这种市场发挥作用,各国政府必须保留在社会和经济事务中大部分现有的权力。

由于这些政府和它们的选民更密切、并对其负责,因此,我们应该在民族国家层面保持权力,这是极为可取的。

欧洲的合作

那么,这是否总是需要在相同的“单一制度结构”下进行呢?

新问题会层出不穷。这些问题需要在同一机构中相同层次和同一种合作模式下解决吗?

对此,我深表怀疑。

我们所需要的灵活性,比欧共体近来所能允许的架构还要大。
单一的制度结构天然倾向于将过多的权力交给中央当局。

共同外交政策将继续按照一项单独的条约(a Separate Treaty)执行,这是一件好事,它既不受欧洲法院的束缚,也不允许委员会随意发起倡议。

如果“欧盟”扩展到新领域,那么必须将它限定在授权明确的单独条约之下。

为什么每一项新的欧洲倡议都需要共同体所有成员的参与呢?

有时情况是——特别是在欧共体扩大后,只有部分共同体成员愿意进入下一步的一体化阶段。

在此,我要向约翰·梅杰(John Major)表示敬意,他成功地说服其他11位成员国政府首脑,他们可以在条约之外,在允许英国不参与的情况下,推行新的社会政策。

它开创了一个至关重要的先例。

一个扩大后的共同体只有在这种灵活性的基础上才能发挥作用。
我们的目标是建立一个多层级的欧洲,其中,由不同国家组成的特别小组——例如申根集团——在个案基础上形成不同程度的合作与整合。
这样的结构或许缺乏方格纸般的整洁,但它可以适应后共产主义时代欧洲的多样性。

欧洲议会

联邦主义的支持者无疑真诚地认为,我们可以通过赋予欧洲议会更多的权力来适应这种多样性。

但民主需要的远不止于此。

要实现欧洲真正的民主,你需要一个建立在单一语言基础上的全欧的公众舆论;成员国都以类似的方式理解全欧范围内各政党的政纲;而且,全欧洲政治辩论所用的政治和经济的概念在任何地方都有着相同的意义。

那么,我们就会处于与哈布斯堡帝国议会相同的地位。

哈布斯堡议会

那个议会是出了名的失败。

它有几十个政党,十来个民族的议员——德国人、意大利人、捷克人、波兰人等。

政府想做任何事情——比如1889年,适度提高征兵名额——都要很长时间,因为各方的利益都要得到安抚。

如果一方不满意,他们的发言人就会采取阻挠的办法——用俄语发表冗长的演讲、敲桌子、扔墨水瓶,甚至还有这样一个场景,来自布拉格的德语大学的法理学教授吹起骑兵的号角。

措施无法(经议会)通过,预算只能靠颁布行政命令通过。
任期最长的首相塔菲伯爵Count Taaffe表示,他在政治上最大的抱负就是实现各方都可忍受的不满——这对欧共体即将到来的危险倒是个不错的描述。
由于议会的不负责任,哈布斯堡王朝只能依靠官僚统治。

这样的例子不胜枚举。

比利时和荷兰的共同之处如此多,但仍然在1831年分离。

瑞典和挪威的共同点甚至更多,却也在1905年分离。

在现代,这似乎是一条简单明了的规则,即包含两种语言的国家,即使它们非常相似,最终也必然分道扬镳,除非一种语言吸收另一种语言。

一个联邦欧洲

主席先生,有时我不禁认为,欧洲委员会和欧洲联邦主义者正在创建的新欧洲(体制),既不能满足成员国的需要,也不符合欧洲人民的愿望。

事实上,这个欧洲汇集了我们这个时代所有最突出的失败。
  • 人为构造巨型国家(mega-satate)的时代已经一去不复返。而欧洲联邦主义者现在正拼命地想要制造一个。

  • 瑞典式的福利国家已经失败——甚至瑞典本身也失败了。而欧洲国家主义者继续推进他们的社会政策。

  • 法国和德国的大规模移民已经鼓励了极端主义政党的发展。而欧盟委员会还在继续敦促我们取消边境管制。

如果欧共体朝着大多数成员国政府和委员会希望的方向推进,那么它们将制造一个催生不安全、失业、国民怨恨和民族冲突的结构。

不安全——因为欧洲的(贸易)保护主义政策将加剧欧美的紧张,甚至两国的关系有断绝之虞,而美国正是欧洲大陆的安全基石。

失业——因为推行监管政策会提高成本,并使欧洲工人失业。

国民怨恨——因为随之而来的单一货币和单一的中央经济政策,将会使一国的选民愤怒,却又无力改变状况。

民族冲突——因为富裕的欧洲国家面临着来自南欧和东欧的移民潮。

同样在欧洲内部,单一货币的影响、工资管制以及社会成本的提升必然会导致以下两种后果之一。

其一,必然有大量资金从一国转移到另一国,我们实际上承担不起这种后果。

其二,会有大量的移民从不富裕的国家移民到更富裕的国家。

然而,如果提供给我们的未来包含了如此多的风险,却没有多少真实的好处,我们可能就要问一下,为什么这一切似乎是不可避免的?

答案很简单。

几乎每个欧洲国家都拒绝对真正重要的问题进行辩论。

抉择

我们的选择很明确:要么通过各国政府、议会之间的合作来实现对欧洲的民主控制——这些政府和议会拥有合法性、富有经验和人民的关系密切。

要么,我们把决策权移交给一个遥远的、操着多语言的议会,它不对真实的欧洲公众舆论负责,而且愈发屈从于一个强大的官僚机构。

任何关于集中主权(pooling sovereignty)的误导性言论都不能改变这一点。

欧洲和世界

主席先生,在本世纪的大部分时间,欧洲给国际事务带来的都是问题,而不是解决办法。欧洲共同体的缔造者有意识地尝试改变这种状况。

欧洲的民主和繁荣将成为其他大陆其他民族的榜样。

有时,这种观点变得过于雄心勃勃,以至于认为欧洲是介于东西方两个超级大国之间的第三股力量。

这种做法一向建立在一种灾难性的幻想之上——西欧在未来的某一天可以放弃美国提供的军事防卫。

既然共产主义势力已经撤退,苏联的坦克和导弹对欧洲核心地区的威胁已经消失,那么欧洲与美国脱钩的旧趋势就有可能再次出现。

这是欧洲人必须警惕的事情——美国也必须意识到这一点。



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 楼主| 发表于 2018-9-11 20:16:08 | 显示全部楼层
1992 May 15 Fr
Margaret Thatcher
Speech in the Hague ("Europe’s Political Architecture")
Document type:
speeches
Document kind:
Speech
Venue:
The Hague
Source:
Thatcher Archive
Journalist:
-
Editorial comments:
MT was speaking to the Global Panel.
Importance ranking:
Key
Word count:
6468
Themes:
Agriculture, Arts & entertainment, Conservative Party (history), Defence (general), Elections & electoral system, Trade, European Union (general), European Union Budget, Economic, monetary & political union, Foreign policy (Central & Eastern Europe), Foreign policy (development, aid, etc), Foreign policy (International organizations), Foreign policy (Middle East), Foreign policy (USA), Foreign policy (USSR & successor states), Foreign policy (Western Europe - non-EU), Labour Party & socialism, Race, immigration, nationality

Europe's Political ArchitectureINTRODUCTION
Mr Chairman,
We are fortunate to be meeting in the Hague, a beautiful city kept beautiful by a country which values its architectural heritage.
Goethe described architecture as ‘frozen music’.
And in a city like this it is not hard to imagine the grand symphonic melodies and subtle chamber music harmonies that might be released if we could defrost the Town Hall, the great urban squares, or some of the smaller side-streets.
Because it is a public art with which we all have to live, architecture tells us a lot about ourselves, about our idea of God, about our relationship with our fellow-men, about our vision of Man's destiny.
The great medieval cathedrals gave us an exalted spiritual view of Man's place in a universe governed by an all-loving and all-seeing Creator.
The Age of Reason pictured civilised man in a neat geometrically ordered landscape dotted with neo-classical structures at regular intervals — with no more than one small folly to each estate.
The revival of Religion and Moral Seriousness under Queen Victoria saw also a Gothic Revival that again pointed man's eyes heavenwards.
And in our own day, the vision of New European Man walking purposefully towards the Common Agricultural Policy was exquisitely realized in the Berlaymont building in Brussels.
What music would Goethe hear if he could look upon the Berlaymont, perhaps while acting as an advisor to the Commissioner responsible for developing a policy for European culture (which has languished so long without one)?
Surely the music would be something atonal and very long, perhaps performed by an orchestra including vacuum cleaners, scrubbing boards, and taxi-horns, with Songs of Harmonisation sung by a mixed choir from the Paris School of Deconstructionism.
And what a climax of discord and disharmony!
For the Berlaymont — its halls lined with cancer-causing asbestos — is to be pulled down.
We might say of such architecture that it is modern in conception, but uncomfortable to live in, and likely to fall down in a few years.
But is it even modern in conception?
It was once.
But look at the architecture of the last fifty years — look, in particular, at the architecture that went beyond the modern to the futuristic.
It was certainly a very dramatic architecture but the one thing it no longer expresses is the Future.
What it expresses is yesterday's vision of the future — one captured by the poet John Betjeman in 1945:

“I have a vision of the future, chum.

The workers' flats, in fields of soya beans,

Tower up like silver pencils, score on score.”
But the Berlaymont school of architecture is a convenient symbol for the political architecture of the European Community.
For it too is infused with the spirit of “yesterday's future.”
Mr Chairman, the European Community we have today was created in very different circumstances to deal with very different problems.
It was built upon very different assumptions about where the world was heading.
And it embodied political ideas and economic theories that in the light of recent history we have to question.
Today I want to do exactly that. In particular, I shall try to answer three questions.
First, how can we best deal with the imbalance in Europe created by the re-unification and revival of Germany?
Second, how can we reform European institutions so that they accommodate the diversity of post-Communist Europe and be truly democratic?
Third, how can we ensure that the new Europe contributes to — rather than undermines — the world's economic prosperity and political stability?
Our answers to these questions can no longer be bound by the conventional collectivist wisdom of the 1940's and 50's.
That is yesterday's future.
We must draw on the ideas of liberty, democracy, free markets and nation-hood that have swept the world in the last decade.
THE BEGINNING OF THE COMMUNITY
The European Community which we now have was set up for circumstances that were quite different from those of to-day.
It was Winston Churchill who, with characteristic magnanimity in 1946, with his Zurich speech, argued that Germany should be rehabilitated through what he called ‘European Union’ as ‘an association between France and Germany’ which would ‘assume direction’.
This could not be done overnight, and it took American leadership.
In 1947, after travelling through Europe in that terrible winter, when everything froze over, George C. Marshall, the then Secretary of State, promoted the idea of American help.
Marshall Aid was administered by institutions set up ad hoc [it had to be, if only because most European states did not have adequate machinery, the Greek delegate being found one day simply making up figures for his country's needs.
The initial impetus was for European recovery.
It owed much to simple American good-heartedness.
It owed something to commercial calculation — the prosperity of Europe, in free-trade conditions, would also be the prosperity of America.
But the main thing was the threat from Stalin.
Eastern Europe had shown how demoralized peoples could not resist cunningly executed Communist take-overs, and Marshall Aid was intended to set western Europe back on its feet.
It was a prodigious success. Who, in 1945, would have guessed that defeated and ruined Germany would, by 1951, be exporting more than the British?
But we have found, again and again, that institutions devised for one set of problems become obstacles to solving the next set — even that they become problems in their own right. The Common Agricultural Policy is one such.
As originally devised, it had a modest aim that was not unreasonable.
Over-numerous peasant farmers had been unable to earn a decent living between the wars, and in those days subsidy and regulation were the conventional wisdom.
We in Great Britain had not suffered nearly as badly as our continental neighbours, because we had, even in 1900, almost no peasants: nonetheless we had, in the 1930's, a Milk Marketing Board which was supposed to control prices, and therefore had the precise function of not marketing milk — instead, pouring it down mine-shafts and regulating various cheeses out of existence.
Yet we all know that the CAP, is now an expensive headache, and one quite likely to derail the Uruguay Round.
Because of agricultural protection we stop food-imports from the poorer countries.
They themselves are nowadays vehement supporters of market-principles: it is from the Cairns Group of developing countries that you hear demands for free trade.
Yet in the industrialized part of the world, the tax-payer and the consumer stump up $270 billion in subsidies and higher costs; and the World Bank has calculated that, if the tariff and other barriers were cut by half, then the poorer countries would gain at once, in exports, $50 billion.
In case you might think that these sentiments are somehow anti-European, I should say that they come from an editorial in the economic section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 4 May.
Here we have a prime example of yesterday's solutions, becoming to-morrow's problems.
You could extend this through the European institutions as a whole.
They were meant to solve post-war problems, and did so in many ways extremely well.
Western Europe did unite against the Soviet threat, and, with Anglo-American precepts, became free and very prosperous.
That prosperity, denied to the peoples of eastern Europe and Russia, in the end caused demoralization among their rulers, and revolt from below. We are now in a quite different set of circumstances, with the Cold War over.
Looking at European institutions today, I am reminded of a remark made about political parties in the French Third Republic.
Some of them had names which reflected radical republican origins from the 1870's, but years later they had become conservative.
These radical names, ran the remark, were like the light reaching Earth from stars that were long extinct.
Equally with the end of the Cold War we have to look again at the shape of Europe and its institutions.
THE GERMAN QUESTION
Mr Chairman, let me turn first to the new situation created by the re-unification of Germany.
And let me say that if I were a German today, I would be proud — proud but also worried.
I would be proud of the magnificent achievement of rebuilding my country, entrenching democracy and assuming the undoubtedly preponderant position in Europe. But I would also be worried about the European Community and its direction.
The German taxpayer pays dearly for its place in Europe.
Britain and Germany have a strong joint interest in ensuring that the other Community countries pay their fair share of the cost — and control the Community's spending more enthusiastically — without leaving us to carry so much of the burden.
Germany is well-equipped to encourage such fiscal prudence. Indeed I would trust the Bundesbank more than any other European Central Bank to keep down inflation — because the Germans have none too distant memories of the total chaos and political extremism which hyper-inflation brings.
The Germans are therefore right to be increasingly worried about the terms they agreed for economic and monetary union.
Were I a German, I would prefer the Bundesbank to provide our modern equivalent of the gold standard rather than any committee of European bankers.
But there is an understandable reluctance on the part of Bonn to defend its views and interests so straightforwardly.
For years the Germans have been led to believe by their neighbours that their respectability depends on their subordinating their national interest to the joint decisions in the Community.
It is better that that pretence be stopped.
A reuinited Germany can't and won't subordinate its national interests in economic or in foreign policy to those of the Community indefinitely.
And sometimes Germany will be right, when the rest are wrong, as it was over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.
Indeed, if the Federal Republic had led the way in recognising these countries earlier, Serbian aggression might have been deterred and much bloodshed prevented.
Whether rightly or wrongly exercised, however, Germany's new pre-eminence is a fact.
We will all be better off if we recognise that modern democratic Germany has come of age.
Nevertheless Germany's power is a problem — as much for the Germans as for the rest of Europe.
Germany is too large to be just another player in the European game, but not large enough to establish unquestioned supremacy over its neighbours.
And the history of Europe since 1870 has largely been concerned with finding the right structure to contain Germany.
It has been Germany's immediate neighbours, the French, who have seen this most clearly.
Both Briand in 1929 and Schuman after the Second World War proposed structures of economic union to achieve this.
Briand's proposal was made just at the moment when the rise of the Nazis made such a visionary scheme impossible and it failed. But Schuman's vision of a European Community was realised because of an almost unique constellation of favourable circumstances.
The Soviet threat made European co-operation imperative.
Germany was itself divided.
Other Western nations sought German participation in the defence of Western Europe.
West Germany needed the respectability that NATO and the Community could give.
And American presence in, and leadership of, Europe reduced the fears of Germany's neighbours.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and reunion of Germany, the entire position has changed.
A new Europe of some 30 states has come into being, the problem of German power has again surfaced and statesmen have been scrambling to produce a solution to it.
At first France hoped that the post-War Franco-German partnership with France as the senior partner would continue. Chancellor Kohl's separate and successful negotiations with Mr Gorbachev quickly showed this to be an illusion.
The next response of France and other European countries was to seek to tie down the German Gulliver within the joint decision-making of the European Community. Again, however, this quickly proved to be an illusion.
Germany's preponderance within the Community is such that no major decision can really be taken against German wishes.
In these circumstance, the Community augments German power rather than containing it.
Let me illustrate this point with two examples where I agree with the German position.
The first, as I have mentioned, was the German decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia which compelled the rest of Europe to follow suit.
The second, is the refusal of the Bundesbank to pursue imprudent financial policies at the urging of some of the countries of the G7.
However much I may sympathise with these policies, the blunt fact is that Germany has followed its own interests rather than the advice of its neighbours who have then been compelled to adjust their own stance.
[In these circumstances Mr Chairman I understand Chancellor Kohl's willingness to surrender Germany's sovereignty in the interests of European unity!]
THE BALANCE OF POWER
What follows from this is that German power will be best accommodated in a looser Europe in which individual nation-states retain their freedom of action.
If Germany or any other power then pursues a policy to which other countries object, it will automatically invite a coalition against itself.
And the resulting solution will reflect the relative weight of the adversaries.
A common foreign policy, however, is liable to express the interests of the largest single actor.
And a serious dispute between EC member states locked into a common foreign policy would precipitate a crisis affecting everything covered by the Community.
The general paradox here is that attempts at co-operation that are too ambitious are likely to create conflict.
We will have more harmonious relationships between the states of Europe if they continue to have room to make their own decisions and to follow their own interests — as happened in the Gulf War.
But it would be idle to deny that such a balance of power — for that is what I have been describing — has sometimes broken down and led to war. And Europe on its own, however organised, will still find the question of German power insoluble.
Europe has really enjoyed stability only since America became a European power.
The third response therefore is to keep an American presence in Europe.
American power is so substantial that it dwarfs the power of any other single European country.
It reassured the rest of Europe in the face of Soviet power until yesterday; and it provides similar comfort against the rise of Germany today — as the Germans themselves appreciate.
Why aren't we worried about the abuse of American power? It is difficult to be anxious about a power so little inclined to throw its weight around that our principal worry is that American troops will go home.
And there's the rub.
There is pressure isolationist opinion in the USA to withdraw from Europe.
It is both provoked and encouraged by similar thinking in the Community which is protectionist in economics and “little European” in strategy.
In trade, in the GATT negotiations, in NATO's restructuring, we need to pursue policies that will persuade America to remain a European power.
EUROPE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC
If America is required to keep Europe secure, what is required to keep Europe free and democratic?
When the founders of the European Community drew up the Treaty of Rome, they incorporated features from two quite different economic traditions.
From Liberalism they took free trade, free markets and competition.
From Socialism (in guises as various as Social Catholicism and Corporatism) they took regulation and intervention.
And for thirty years — up to the signing of the Single European Act — these two traditions were in a state of perpetual but unacknowledged tension.
Now — with the Commission exploiting the Single European Act to accumulate powers of greater direction and regulation — Europe is reaching the point at which it must choose between these two approaches.
Is it to be a tightly-regulated, centralised bureaucratic federal state, imposing uniform standards throughout the Continent?
Or is it to be a loose-knit decentralised free-market Europe of sovereign states, based upon competition between different national systems of tax and regulation within a free trade area?
M. Delors at least seems to be quite clear.
Before the ink is even dry on the Maastricht Treaty, the President of the European Commission, who has always been admirably frank about his ambitions, is seeking more money and more powers for the Commission which would become the Executive of the Community, in other words a European Government.
And this initative comes on top of a Treaty that met the Commission's demand for a “single institutional structure” for the Community.
So there is no doubt what the President of the Commission is aiming at — it is a tightly centralised European federal state.
Nor is there any mystery about the urgency with which he presses the Federalist cause.
Even though he may wish to defer the “enlargement” of the Community with the accession of Eastern Europe, he realises it is impossible.
A half-Europe imposed by Soviet tyrany was one thing; a half-Europe imposed by Brussels would be a moral catastrophe depriving the Community of its European legitimacy.
The Commission knows it will have to admit new members in the next few decades.
But it hopes to construct a centralised European super-state in advance — and irrevocably — so that the new members will have to apply for entry on federalist terms.
This is not so much constructing a common European home — as a Common European Prison.
And it's just not on.
Imagine a European Community of 30 nations, ranging in their economic productivity from Germany to Ukraine, and in their political stability from Britain to Poland,
—all governed from Brussels;
—all enforcing the same conditions at work;
—all having the same worker rights as the German Unions;
—all subject to the same interest rates, monetary, fiscal and economic policies;
—all agreeing on a common Foreign and defence policy;
—and all accepting the authority of an Executive and a remote foreign Parliament over “80&% of economic and social legislation” .
Mr Chairman, such a body is an even more utopian enterprise than the Tower of Babel.
For at least the builders of Babel all spoke the same language when they began.
They were, you might say, communautaire.
Mr Chairman, the thinking behind the Commission's proposals is essentially the thinking of “yesterday's tomorrow” .
It was how the best minds of Europe saw the future in the ruins after the Second World War.
But they made a central intellectual mistake.
They assumed that the model for future government was that of a centralised bureaucracy that would collect information upwards, make decisions at the top, and then issue orders downwards.
And what seemed the wisdom of the ages in 1945 was in fact a primitive fallacy.
Hierarchical bureaucracy may be a suitable method of organising a small business that is exposed to fierce external competition — but it is a recipe for stagnation and inefficiency in almost every other context.
It can collect and use only a fraction of the information that the market picks up, and acts upon minute by minute — and so it gets it wrong.
The top cannot be sure that its orders are carried out by the bottom.
And the organisation as a whole has no feedback that would indicate whether it is performing well or badly.
Such flaws might be of minor importance in a monastery where, after all, the wishes of the monks are not the criteria of success.
In a Government, however, they produce the economic chaos and alienation we saw under communism.
Yet it is precisely this model of remote, centralised, bureaucratic organisation that the European Commission and its federalist supporters seek to impose on a Community which they acknowledge may soon contain many more countries of widely differing levels of political and economic development, and speaking more than fifteen languages.
“C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la politique.”
The larger Europe grows, the more diverse must be the forms of co-operation it requires. Instead of a centralised bureaucracy, the model should be a market — not only a market of individuals and companies, but also a market in which the players are governments.
Thus governments would compete with each other for foreign investments, top management and high earners through lower taxes and less regulation.
Such a market would impose a fiscal discipline on governments because they would not want to drive away expertise and business.
It would also help to establish which fiscal and regulatory policies produced the best overall economic results.
No wonder socialists don't like it.
To make such a market work, of course, national governments must retain most of their existing powers in social and economic affairs.
Since these governments are closer and accountable to their voters — it is doubly desirable that we should keep power at the national level.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
Mr Chairman, in 1996, when the arrangements agreed at Maastricht are due to be reviewed, and probably a good deal earlier, the Community should move in exactly the opposite direction to that proposed by the President of the Commission.
A Community of sovereign states committed to voluntary co-operation, a lightly regulated free market and international free trade does not need a Commission in its present form.
The government of the Community — to the extent that this term is appropriate — is the Council of Ministers, consisting of representatives of democratically elected national governments.
The work of the Commission should cease to be legislative in any sense.
It should be an administrative body, like any professional civil service, and it should not initiate policy, but rather carry it out.
In doing this it should be subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament acting on the model of Commons Select Committees.
In that way, whatever collective policies or regulations are required would emerge from deliberation between democratic governments accountable to their national parliaments rather than being imposed by a bureaucracy with its own agenda.
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
But need this always be done in the same “single institutional structure” ?
New problems arise all the time. Will these always require the same level and type of co-operation in the same institutions?
I doubt it.
We need a greater flexibility than the structures of the European Community have allowed until very recently.
A single institutional structure of its nature tends to place too much power in the central authorities.
It is a good thing that a Common Foreign Policy will continue to be carried on under a Separate Treaty and will neither be subject to the European Court nor permit the Commission to fire off initiatives at will.
If “Europe” moves into new areas, it must do so under separate treaties which clearly define the powers which have been surrendered.
And why need every new European initiative require the participation of all members of the Community?
It will sometimes be the case — especially after enlargement that only some Community members will want to move forward to another stage of integration.
Here I pay tribute to John Major's achievement in persuading the other 11 Community Heads of Government that they could move ahead to a Social Chapter but not within the treaty and without Britain's participation.
It sets a vital precedent.
For an enlarged Community can only function if we build in flexibility of that kind.
We should aim at a multi-track Europe in which ad hoc groups of different states — such as the Schengen Group — forge varying levels of co-operation and integration on a case-by-case basis.
Such a structure would lack graph paper neatness.
But it would accommodate the diversity of post-Communist Europe.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Supporters of federalism argue, no doubt sincerely, that we can accommodate this diversity by giving more powers to the European Parliament.
But democracy requires more than that.
To have a genuine European democracy — you would need a Europe-wide public opinion based on a single language; Europe-wide political parties with a common programme understood similarly in all member-states; a Europe-wide political debate in which political and economic concepts and words had the same agreed meaning everywhere.
We would be in the same position as the unwielding Habsburg Empire's Parliament.
THE HABSBURG PARLIAMENT
That parliament was a notorious failure.
There were dozens of political parties, and nearly a dozen peoples were represented — Germans, Italians, Czechs, Poles and so on.
For the government to get anything through — for instance, in 1889 a modest increase in the number of conscripts — took ages, as all the various interests had to be propitiated.
When one or other was not satisfied, its spokesmen resorted to obstruction — lengthy speeches in Russian, banging of desk-lids, throwing of ink-wells and on one occasion the blowing of a cavalry trumpet by the Professor of Jurisprudence at the German University of Prague.
Measures could not be passed, and budgets could only be produced by decree.
The longest-lasting prime minister, Count Taaffe, remarked that his highest ambition in politics was the achievement of supportable dissatisfaction on all sides — not a bad description of what the European Community risks becoming.
And because of the irresponsibility of parliaments, the Habsburg Monarchy could really only be ruled by bureaucrats.
It took twenty-five signatures for a tax-payment to be validated; one in four people in employment worked for the state in some form or another, even in 1914, and so many resources went to all of this that not much was left for defence: even, the military bands had to be cut back, Radetzky March and all.
Of course it was a tremendous period in cultural terms both in Vienna and in Budapest.
We in England have done mightily well by the emigration, often forced, to our shores of so many talented people from Central Europe.
But the fact is that they had to leave their native lands because political life became impossible.
This example could be multiplied again and again.
Belgium and Holland, which have so much in common, split apart in 1831.
Sweden and Norway, which have even more in common, split apart in 1905.
It does seem simply to be a straight-forward rule in modern times that countries which contain two languages, even if they are very similar, must in the end divide, unless the one language absorbs the other.
It would be agreeable to think that we could all go back to the world of the Middle Ages, when the educated classes spoke Latin, and the rulers communicated in grunts.
But we cannot.
Unless we are dealing with international co-operation and alliances, freely entered-into, we create artificial structures which become the problem that they were meant to address.
The League of Nations when the Second World War broke out, resolved to ignore the fact and to discuss, instead, the standardization of level-crossings.
A FEDERAL EUROPE
Mr Chairman, I am sometimes tempted to think that the new Europe which the Commission and Euro-federalists are creating is equally ill-equipped to satisfy the needs of its members and the wishes of their peoples.
It is, indeed, a Europe which combines all the most striking failures of our age.
—The day of the artificially constructed megastate has gone. So the Euro-federalists are now desperately scurrying to build one.
—The Swedish style welfare state has failed — even in Sweden. So the Euro-statists press ahead with their Social Chapter.
—Large scale immigration has in France and Germany already encouraged the growth of extremist parties. So the the European Commission is pressing us to remove frontier controls.
If the European Community proceeds in the direction which the majority of Member State Governments and the Commission seem to want they will create a structure which brings insecurity, unemployment, national resentment and ethnic conflict.
Insecurity — because Europe's protectionism will strain and possibly sever that link with the United States on which the security of the continent ultimately depends.
Unemployment — because the pursuit of policies of regulation will increase costs, and price European workers out of jobs.
National resentment — because a single currency and a single centralised economic policy, which will come with it, will leave the electorate of a country angry and powerless to change its conditions .
Ethnic conflict — because not only will the wealthy European countries be faced with waves of immigration from the South and from the East.
Also within Europe itself, the effect of a single currency and regulation of wages and social costs will have one of two consequences.
Either there will have to be a massive transfer of money from one country to another, which will not in practice be affordable.
Or there there will be massive migration from the less successful to the more successful countries.
Yet if the future we are being offered contains so very many risks and so few real benefits, why it may be asked is it proving all but irresistible ?
The answer is simple.
It is that in almost every European country there has been a refusal to debate the issues which really matter.
And little can matter more than whether the ancient, historic nations of Europe are to have their political institutions and their very identities transformed by stealth into something neither wished nor understood by their electorates.
Yet so much is it the touchstone of respectability to accept this ever closer union, now interpreted as a federal destiny, that to question is to invite affected disbelief or even ridicule.
This silent understanding — this Euro-snobbism — between politicians, bureaucracies, academics, journalists and businessmen is destructive of honest debate.
So John Major deserves high praise for ensuring at Maastricht that we would not have either a Single Currency or the absurd provisions of the Social Chapter forced upon us: our industry, workforce, and national prosperity will benefit as a result.
Indeed, as long as we in Britain now firmly control our spending and reduce our deficit, we will be poised to surge ahead in Europe.
For our taxes are low: our inflation is down: our debt is manageable: our reduced regulations are favourable to business.
We take comfort from the fact that both our Prime Minister and our Foreign Secretary have spoken out sharply against the forces of bureaucracy and federalism.
THE CHOICE
Our choice is clear: Either we exercise democratic control of Europe through co-operation between national governments and parliaments which have legitimacy, experience and closeness to the people.
Or, we transfer decisions to a remote multi-lingual parliament, accountable to no real European public opinion and thus increasingly subordinate to a powerful bureaucracy.
No amount of misleading language about pooling sovereignty can change that.
EUROPE AND THE WIDER WORLD
Mr Chairman, in world affairs for most of this century Europe has offered problems, not solutions. The founders of the European Community were consciously trying to change that.
Democracy and prosperity in Europe were to be an example to other peoples in other continents.
Sometimes this view took an over-ambitious turn with talk of Europe as a third force brokering between two superpowers of East and West.
This approach was always based upon a disastrous illusion — that Western Europe could at some future date dispense with the military defence offered by the United States.
Now that the forces of Communism have retreated and the threat which Soviet tanks and missiles levelled at the heart of Europe has gone, there is a risk that the old tendency towards de-coupling Europe from the United States may again emerge.
This is something against which Europeans themselves must guard — and of which the United States must be aware.
This risk could become reality in several ways.
TRADE
First, there is the question of trade.
It is a terrible indictment of the complacency which characterises the modern post-Cold War world that we have allowed the present GATT round to be stalled for so long.
Free trade is the greatest force for prosperity and peaceful cooperation.
It does no good to the Western alliance when Europe and the United States come to regard each other as hostile interests. In practice, whatever the theory may be, economic disputes do sour political relations.
Agricultural subsidies and tarriffs lie at the heart of the dispute which will not go away unless we in Europe decide that the Common Agricultural Policy has to be fundamentally changed.
That will go far to determine what kind of Europe we are building.
For, as I have said before, I would like to see the European Community — embracing include the former Communist countries to its East — agree to develop an Atlantic free trade area with the United States.
That would be a means of pressing for more open multi-lateral trade throughout the world.
Europe must seek to move the world away from competing regional trade blocs — not promote them.
In such a trading arrangement, Britain would have a vital role bridging that Atlantic divide — just as Germany should provide Europe with a bridge to the East and to the countries of the former Soviet Union.
EASTERN EUROPE
Secondly, we must modify and modernise our defence.
The dangers on Europe's Eastern border have receded.
But let us not forget that on the credibility of NATO's military strength all our wider objectives depend — reassurance for the post-communist countries, stability in Europe, trans-Atlantic political co-operation.
Communism may have been vanquished.
But all too often the Communists themselves have not.
The chameleon qualities of the comrades have never been more clearly demonstrated than in their emergence as democratic socialists and varieties of nationalist in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
From the powerful positions they retain in the bureaucracy, security apparatus and the armed forces, from their places in not-really-privatised enterprises, they are able to obstruct, undermine and plunder.
The systems of proportional representation which so many of these countries have adopted have allowed these tactics to succeed all the more, leading to weak governments and a bewildering multiplicity of parties.
All this risks bringing democracy into discredit.
If Eastern European countries which retain some links with a pre-communist past, and have some sort of middle class on which to draw, falter on the path to reform, how will the leaders of the countries of the former Soviet Union dare to proceed further upon it?
We can help by allowing them free access to our markets.
I am delighted that Association agreements have been signed between the European Community and several of these countries.
I would like speedy action to include the others in similar arrangement.
But, ten years is too long to wait before the restrictions on trade are removed.
And I would like to see these countries offered full membership of the European Community rapidly [after that].
Above all we must offer these countries greater security.
Russian troops are still stationed on Polish territory.
Moreover, it is understandable that the central and eastern European countries are alarmed at what conflict in the old USSR and the old Yugoslavia may portend.
Although I recognise that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has been formed with a view to this, I still feel that the European ex-Communist countries are entitled to that greater degree of reassurance which a separate closer relationship with NATO would bring.
SECURITY
But, Mr Chairman, most of the threats to Europe's and the West's interests no longer come from this Continent.
I believe — and I have been urging this on NATO members since 1990 — that the American and Europeans ought to be able to deploy our forces under NATO outside the area for which the present North Atlantic Treaty allows.
It is impossible to know where the danger may next come.
But two considerations should make us alive to real risks to our security.
First, the break up of the Soviet Union has led to large numbers of advanced weapons becoming available to would-be purchasers at knock-down prices: it would be foolish to imagine that these will not, some of them, fall into the worst possible hands.
Second, Europe cannot ignore its dependence for oil on the Middle East.
Saddam Hussein is still in power.
Fundamentalism is as strong as ever.
Old scores are still unsettled. We must beware.
And we must widen our ability to defend our interests and be prepared to act when necessary.
THE COMMUNITY'S WIDER ROLE
Finally, the European Community must come to recognise its place in what is called the new world order.
The ending of the Cold War has meant that the international institutions created in the post-War years — the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT — can work much more effectively. This means that the role for the Community is inevitably circumscribed.
Within Europe, a wider role for NATO and the CSCE should also be reflected in more modest ambitions for the Community's diplomacy.
In Yugoslavia, the Community has shown itself incapable of dealing effectively with security questions.
Outside Europe, GATT with its mandate to reduce trade barriers should be the body that establishes the rules of the game in trade.
The Community must learn to live within those rules.
All in all, the Community must be prepared to fit in with the new internationalism, not supplant it.
CONCLUSION
Mr Chairman, I end as I began with architecture.
The Hague is a splendid capital, and how much we should admire the Dutch for keeping it together so well, as they have done with so many other of their towns.
The Mauritshuis is a testimony to the genius which they showed.
It was here, and in Amsterdam that so much of the modern world was invented in the long Dutch fight for freedom.
Dutch architecture, here and in Amsterdam, has its own unmistakable elegance and durability — it was copied all around the north-European world, from Wick in northern Scotland to Tallinn in Estonia.
Some architecture does last. Other architecture does not.
Let us make sure that we build a Europe as splendid and lasting as the Mauritshuis rather than one as shabby and ephemeral as the Berlaymont.



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