基督教在中国

Supervisor

基督教在中国

hadeshy ECO中文网   2017-06-16

THE coastal city of Wenzhou is sometimes called China’s Jerusalem. Ringed by mountains and far from the capital, Beijing, it has long been a haven for a religion that China’s Communist leaders view with deep unease: Christianity. Most cities of its size, with about 9m people, have no more than a dozen or so visibly Christian buildings. Until recently, in Wenzhou, hundreds of crosses decorated church roofs.

中国的海滨城市温州有时会被称作该国的耶路撒冷。身处群山，帝都渺远，长久以来它一直是一个令中共领导人深感不安的宗教——基督教的避风港。绝大多数与温州规模相当的城市，人口在900万左右，公开场合的基督教建筑不足一打，而温州呢，直到最近，还有数百个十字架装点着教堂的屋顶。

This year, however, more than 230 have been classed as “illegal structures” and removed. Videos posted on the internet show crowds of parishioners trying to form a human shield around their churches. Dozens have been injured. Other films show weeping believers defiantly singing hymns as huge red crosses are hoisted off the buildings. In April one of Wenzhou’s largest churches was completely demolished. Officials are untroubled by the clash between the city’s famously freewheeling capitalism and the Communist Party’s ideology, yet still see religion and its symbols as affronts to the party’s atheism.

然而，就在今年，超过230个十字架被当作“违章建筑”予以拆除。网上流出的视频显示，成群的教民们试图在教堂周围拱卫出一道人墙。数十人受伤。其他视频也播出了巨大的红色十字架被起重机吊起时，在旁痛哭的信徒近乎挑衅地吟唱赞美诗的镜头。四月份温州最大的教堂之一被彻底拆除，该市素来以自由放任的资本主义经济闻名，当地官员并不因之与共产主义的意识形态相左而困扰，却仍将宗教及其符号视为对共党无神论的公然冒犯。

Christians in China have long suffered persecution. Under Mao Zedong, freedom of belief was enshrined in the new Communist constitution (largely to accommodate Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists in the west of the country). Yet perhaps as many as half a million Christians were harried to death, and tens of thousands more were sent to labour camps. Since the death of Mao in 1976, the party has slowly allowed more religious freedom. Most of the churches in Wenzhou are so-called “Three Self” churches, of which there are about 57,000 round the country. These, in the official jargon, are self-supporting, self-governed and self-propagating (therefore closed to foreign influence). They profess loyalty to China, and are registered with the government. But many of those in Wenzhou had obviously incurred official displeasure all the same; and most of the Christians who survived Maoist persecution, along with many new believers, refuse to join such churches anyway, continuing to meet in unregistered “house churches”, which the party for a long time tried to suppress.

基督徒在中国长期遭受迫害。毛泽东时期，信仰自由被庄严载入新中国宪法（很大程度上是为了安抚中国西部的回教徒和西藏佛教徒。）但仍有大约五十万基督徒被折磨至死，成千上万信徒被送去劳改。1976年毛泽东去世之后，中共渐渐开始放宽宗教自由。温州大多数教会就是所谓的“三自爱国教会”，这类教会在全国有大约57,000所。“三自”是一个官方术语，意为“自治、自养、自传”（因此隔绝外国影响）。他们公开宣称忠于国家，在政府机关登记注册。但是温州的很多“三自”教会显然还是惹起了政府的不快；毛时代迫害中得以幸存的大多数基督教徒，以及很多新入教的信徒，无论如何都拒绝加入此类教会，而是在未合法登记的“家庭教会”中继续集会，后者正是中共长期以来欲予打压的。

Christianity is hard to control in China, and getting harder all the time. It is spreading rapidly, and infiltrating the party’s own ranks. The line is blurring between house churches and official ones, and Christians are starting to emerge from hiding to play a more active part in society. The Communist Party has to find a new way to deal with all this. There is even talk that the party, the world’s largest explicitly atheist organisation, might follow its sister parties in Vietnam and Cuba and allow members to embrace a dogma other than—even higher than—that of Marx.

基督教在中国的传播难以被打压，这种难度还在与日俱增。它迅速传开，甚至渗入党的内部。家庭教会和官方认可教会的界限日趋模糊，教徒不再躲躲藏藏，转而在社会上发挥积极的影响。中共必须找到新的应对方式。甚至有传言，世界上最大的公开宣扬无神论的政党——中国共产党，也许会效仿它在越南古巴的兄弟党派，允许党员信奉马克思主义之外、乃至可以高于马克思主义的教条。

Any shift in official thinking on religion could have big ramifications for the way China handles a host of domestic challenges, from separatist unrest among Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs in the country’s west to the growth of NGOs and “civil society”—grassroots organisations, often with a religious colouring, which the party treats with suspicion, but which are also spreading fast.

官方“宗教思维”的任何风吹草动，都会对该国处理一系列国内挑战的方式产生巨大的衍生影响。从西藏佛教徒、中国西部维吾尔族穆斯林中的分离主义者骚动，到NGO和“公民社会”——草根组织的成长，常常都蒙上一层宗教色彩，虽然官方对此满腹狐疑，仍阻挡不了它们的迅速蔓延。

The upsurge in religion in China, especially among the ethnic Han who make up more than 90% of the population, is a general one. From the bullet trains that sweep across the Chinese countryside, passengers can see new churches and temples springing up everywhere. Buddhism, much longer established in China than Christianity, is surging too, as is folk religion; many more Han are making pilgrimages to Buddhist shrines in search of spiritual comfort. All this worries many officials, for whom religion is not only Marx’s “opium of the people” but also, they believe, a dangerous perverter of loyalty away from the party and the state. Christianity, in particular, is associated with 19th-century Western imperial encroachment; and thus the party’s treatment of Christians offers a sharp insight into the way its attitudes are changing.

中国宗教势力的抬头，特别是在占总人口90%以上的汉民族当中的传播，乃是大势所趋。坐在高铁列车上，沿途经过无数中国农村，新落成的教堂和寺庙随处映入眼帘。较之基督教，在中国根基更为久远的佛教，也在以民间宗教的身份急速扩张。越来越多的汉人去佛寺进香，寻找精神慰藉。所有的这一切急坏了官员们，对他们来说宗教不仅是马克思所言“人民的精神鸦片”，而且他们也相信，这会扭曲人们对党、对国家的忠诚。尤其是基督教，与19世纪西方帝国主义的入侵相关联，因此中共如何处置基督教，有助于我们敏锐地洞察其态度转变的过程。

It is hard even to guess at the number of Christians in China. Official surveys seek to play down the figures, ignoring the large number who worship in house churches. By contrast, overseas Christian groups often inflate them. There were perhaps 3m Catholics and 1m Protestants when the party came to power in 1949. Officials now say there are between 23m and 40m, all told. In 2010 the Pew Research Centre, an American polling organisation, estimated there were 58m Protestants and 9m Catholics. Many experts, foreign and Chinese, now accept that there are probably more Christians than there are members of the 87m-strong Communist Party. Most are evangelical Protestants.

中国究竟有多少基督徒？说不好。官方调查力图压低这一数字，无视在家庭教会做礼拜的大批信徒。相比之下，海外的基督教团体又往往夸大其词。1949年中共掌权之时，大约有300万天主教徒和100万新教徒。现在官员们说总计数字在2,300万到4,000万之间。2010年皮尤研究中心估计中国有5,800万新教徒和900万天主教徒。很多中外专家如今都接受这一说法：基督教徒的数量或许已经超过了中共党员的数量（8,700万）。绝大多数是福音派教徒。

Predicting Christianity’s growth is even harder. Yang Fenggang of Purdue University, in Indiana, says the Christian church in China has grown by an average of 10% a year since 1980. He reckons that on current trends there will be 250m Christians by around 2030, making China’s Christian population the largest in the world. Mr Yang says this speed of growth is similar to that seen in fourth-century Rome just before the conversion of Constantine, which paved the way for Christianity to become the religion of his empire.

基督教的扩张速度更是难以预计。印第安纳州普渡大学的杨凤岗称，自1980年以来，中国的基督教堂以每年10%的速度增长。按照这个趋势，他估算到2030年左右，中国会有2亿5千万基督教徒，成为全世界基督教徒数目最多的国家。杨说，这一增长情形正与14世纪康斯坦丁大帝上位之前的罗马相似，当时这为康斯坦丁帝国接受基督教为国教铺平了道路。

In the 1980s the faith grew most quickly in the countryside, stimulated by the collapse of local health care and a belief that Christianity could heal instead. In recent years it has been burgeoning in cities. A new breed of educated, urban Christians has emerged. Gerda Wielander of the University of Westminster, in her book “Christian Values in Communist China”, says that many Chinese are attracted to Christianity because, now that belief in Marxism is declining, it offers a complete moral system with a transcendental source. People find such certainties appealing, she adds, in an age of convulsive change.

上世纪80年代，受农村医疗合作制度瓦解、而人们普遍相信基督教可以从内而外治愈疾病的影响，基督教信仰在乡村传播的最快。近些年它开始在城市生根发芽。新一代受过教育的城市基督徒开始出现。威斯敏斯特大学的格尔达•维兰德在她的《共产主义中国的基督价值观》一书中，称马克思主义信仰的衰落导致很多中国人转向宗教，因为宗教提供了一套完整的道德系统，并有上帝的指引。她补充道，在这个骚动的时代，人们会被这种确定性深深吸引。

Some Chinese also discern in Christianity the roots of Western strength. They see it as the force behind the development of social justice, civil society and rule of law, all things they hope to see in China. Many new NGOs are run by Christians or Buddhists. There are growing numbers of Christian doctors and academics. More than 2,000 Christian schools are also dotted around China, many of them small and all, as yet, illegal.

一些中国人也看出了基督教是西方世界力量的根源。他们把它看做一股背后的力量，能够推动社会正义、公民社会和法治国家，推动他们希望在中国看到的一切。很多新生的NGO是由基督徒或佛教徒运营。信仰基督教的博士和学者也越来越多。超过2000所基督教学校散落于全国各地，它们当中很多规模还很小，而且到目前为止，全部都是不合法的机构。

One civil-rights activist says that, of the 50 most-senior civil-rights lawyers in China, probably half are Christians. Some of them have set up the Association of Human Rights Attorneys for Chinese Christians. Groups of well-paid urban Christian lawyers join together to defend Christians—and others—in court. Missionaries have begun to go out from China to the developing world.

据一位民权积极分子透露，中国50位最资深的民权律师当中，也许一半都是基督教徒。他们中的一些人已经组建了中国基督教律师人权委员会。大批来自城市的高收入律师信徒参与进来，为基督教徒——以及其他人——在法庭上辩护。传教士开始走出国门，走向发展中国家。

The authorities have responded to this in different ways. In places like Wenzhou, they have cracked down. Implementation of religious policy is often left to local officials. Some see toughness as a way of displaying loyalty to the central leadership.

官方对此反应不一。像温州，他们的选择是打压。宗教政策的生杀大权往往掌握在地方官员手中。有些把强硬手段当成向中央表忠心的方式。

China Aid, an American church group, says that last year more than 7,400 Christians suffered persecution in China. And there is still plenty of less visible discrimination. But 7,400 people are less than 0.01% of all Chinese Christians. Even if the figure is higher, in this century “persecution is clearly no longer the norm”, says Brent Fulton of ChinaSource, a Christian group in Hong Kong.

美国的一个宗教团体，对华援助协会，称去年一年里中国有超过7,400名基督教徒受到迫害。还有更多隐形歧视不一而足。不过7,400人还不到全中国基督教众的0.01%，就算实际数字比这个更高，如布伦特•富尔顿所言——他来自香港的一个基督教组织“华源协作”——本世纪“迫害显然不再是常态”。

That is largely because many officials see advantages in Christianity’s growth. Some wealthy business folk in Wenzhou have become believers—they are dubbed “boss Christians”—and have built large churches in the city. One holds evening meetings at which businessmen and women explain “biblical” approaches to making money. Others form groups encouraging each other to do business honestly, pay taxes and help the poor. Rare is the official anywhere in China who would want to scare away investors from his area.

很大程度上，这是由于许多官员看到了基督教的扩张有利可图。温州的一些商业巨贾成了信徒——他们被称作“老板基督徒”——在当地建造了大型教堂。其中有个教堂会举办晚间集会，男男女女的商人在此解释何为遵循圣经的生财之道。其他的教会组建小团体，相互鼓励诚信经商、纳税济贫。没有哪个地方的中国官员会想把自己地界上的财主吓跑。

In other regions local leaders lend support, or turn a blind eye, because they find that Christians are good citizens. Their commitment to community welfare helps to reinforce precious stability. In some large cities the government itself is sponsoring the construction of new Three Self churches: Chongyi church, in Hangzhou, can seat 5,000 people. Three Self pastors are starting to talk to house-church leaders; conversely, house-church leaders (often correctly) no longer consider official churches to be full of party stooges.

其他地区的官员要么给予支持，要么睁一只眼闭一只眼，因为他们发现基督徒通常都是良好市民。他们投身于社区福利的建设中，为一方稳定贡献颇多。在一些大城市，政府本身也是“三自”教堂建设的出资人：比如说杭州的崇一教堂，可以容纳5,000名信徒。“三自”教会的牧师开始和家庭教会的组织者对话，反过来，家庭教会的组织者也不再认为官方教会里的人都是中共的傀儡。

In recent years the party’s concerns have shifted from people beliefs to the maintenance of stability and the party’s monopoly of power. If working with churches helps achieve these aims, it will do so, even though it still frets about encouraging an alternative source of authority. In 2000 Jiang Zemin, then party chief, and himself a painter of calligraphy for his local Buddhist temples, said in an official speech that religion would probably still be around when concepts of class and state had vanished.

近几年来，党关注的重点不再是人们的信仰，而是如何维护稳定、如何垄断权力。倘若与教会携手可以实现上述目标，也未尝不可，即使中共仍对支持另一套权威体系心存疑虑。2000年彼时的中共中央总书记江泽民，就曾为他家乡的一座佛寺留下过墨宝，他在官方讲话中说过，即使阶级和国家的概念消亡了，宗教可能还是会存在。

Increasingly, the party needs the help of religious believers. It is struggling to supply social services efficiently; Christian and Buddhist groups are willing, and able, to help. Since about 2003, religious groups in Hong Kong have received requests from mainland government officials to help set up NG O s and charities. In an age of hedonism and corruption, selfless activism has helped the churches’ reputation; not least, it has persuaded the regime that Christians are not out to overthrow it. For the Catholic church, though, the situation is trickier: allegiance to Rome is still seen by some officials as a sign of treachery.

中共越来越需要宗教信徒的帮忙。它在提供高效社会服务的道路上举步维艰。基督教和佛教团体有意愿也有能力提供帮助。大约从03年起，香港的宗教团体就有收到大陆官员的指示，要求协助组建NGO和慈善机构。在享乐和贪腐甚嚣尘上的今天，教会无私的实干作派让他们饱受赞誉。尤其是它已经让中共政权相信，基督徒不是来推翻他们的。不过对于天主教会而言，事情就稍微麻烦点儿：他们宣誓效忠罗马教廷，这在一些官员眼里无异里通外国。

Ms Wielander says she does not believe the flock will go on growing by 10% year in, year out. But she admits that the party is now paying more attention to the increasing religiosity of ordinary Chinese. So, in some areas, it is modifying its attitude and official rhetoric (while keeping intense pressure on Buddhist Tibetans and Muslim Uighurs, whose religious beliefs are seen to threaten the integrity of the state). In May last year the head of the Russian Orthodox church was welcomed by Mr Xi in Beijing, the first such foreign church leader to meet China’s party chief.

维兰德女士说她不相信信徒的数量会以每年10%的速度增长。但是她承认中共现在加大了对越来越多的普通中国人皈依宗教的关注。所以在有些地方，他们的态度有所缓和，官方言辞也有所调整（但是对于西藏佛教徒和维吾尔族穆斯林持续高压政策，这两派的宗教信仰有可能威胁到国家的统一）。去年五月，俄罗斯东正教的大牧首在北京受到习近平总书记的接见，这也是如此高规格的宗教领导人头一回与中共总书记会晤。

When the Communist Party allowed entrepreneurs to join in 2001, some voices suggested that it should also allow religious believers to do so. Pan Yue, a reformist official, wrote a newspaper article to that effect entitled, “The religious views of the Communist Party must keep up with the times”. One influence was the decision of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1990 to allow its members to be religious believers. The move went smoothly, and may even have helped to stabilise Vietnam after its turbulent recent past. In China, however, Mr Pan’s idea was ignored.

从2001年起，企业家被允许入党，那时就有声音建议宗教人士也应当被允许入党。一位改革派官员潘岳曾就此在报纸上发表了题为《马克思主义宗教观必须与时俱进》的文章。动因之一就是1990年越共做出允许其成员入教的决定。这一举措顺利实施，甚至帮助稳定了曾经动荡不安的越南。但在中国，潘的提议被忽视了。

One Chinese article in 2004 claimed that 3m-4m party members had become Christians. Despite that, the party still has doubts about officially admitting them. Recent pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong are likely to reinforce those fears: some of the organisers were Christians. It worries the regime that the growth of house churches may also provide more room for the growth of quasi-Christian cults, which may then—like the banned Falun Gong movement—become politicised, and turn anti-Communist. The party’s fear of such cults is rooted in history. The Taiping rebellion in the mid-19th century, led by a man calling himself the brother of Jesus, resulted in more than 20m deaths.

2004年一篇中文报道宣称有300到400万党员信仰基督教。尽管如此，中共始终对于官方认可疑虑重重。香港最近的民主抗议很有可能加剧了这一疑惧：抗议的某些组织者是基督教众。中共政权担心家庭教会的成长可能也会为披着基督教外衣的邪教组织提供土壤，然后就会像遭禁的falungong运动一样，被政治化，最终走向党的对立面。中共对于邪教组织的恐惧根植于历史。19世纪中期的太平天国运动，就是由某位自称耶稣兄弟的人领导，最终导致超过2,000万人丧生。

But some officials are becoming more discerning in their crackdowns. This has been evident in Beijing where, around 2005, two large house churches began renting office space for their Sunday services. The largest, Shouwang church, was led by Jin Tianming, a graduate of Beijing’s elite Tsinghua University. It drew an intellectual crowd from the university district. On some Sundays up to 1,000 people attended services. Parishioners could download sermons from the church’s website. Mr Jin was known to be quietly arguing for more religious freedom. He tried to register Shouwang as a legal but independent congregation, not under the control of the official church, but was turned down. In 2009, just before a visit by America’s president, Barack Obama, the government forced the landlord of the building to terminate the church’s lease. Mr Jin took his congregation into a nearby park, where they worshipped in the snow. He and the church elders were placed under house arrest and many parishioners were detained. They had crossed a political red line.

不过在打压过程中，有些官员的目光逐渐敏锐。这在北京尤为明显。2005年，两个规模较大的家庭教会开始租用办公地点举行主日礼拜。其中最大的一个教会“守望教会”，由清华大学毕业的金天明牧师领导，吸引了大学区的大批知识分子。某些主日里，有将近千人参与礼拜。教民可以从网上下载布道词。金牧师一向以平和争取更多宗教自由闻名，他试图将守望教会注册为合法但独立的宗教团体，不受官方教会控制，但是遭到了拒绝。2009年，就在美国总统奥巴马访华前夕，政府强迫教会租用楼房的房东终止了租约。金牧师将他的教会搬到了附近的公园，在雪中继续礼拜。他和教会的元老们遭到软禁，很多信徒被拘留。他们还是踩了政治的红线。

It is a different story on the other side of Beijing. In an office building just off the third ring road another unregistered congregation, known as Zion church, meets in a similar venue; its pastor, Jin Mingri, is a graduate of Peking University. Like Shouwang, Zion covers an entire floor and includes a bookshop and a café offering loyalty cards to coffee-drinkers. The main hall holds 400 people. It looks and feels like a church in suburban America. Zion’s pastors preach equally uncompromising evangelical sermons, yet the church remains open because it is more cautious in how it engages with sensitive issues.

在北京的另一边儿，故事却完全不同。就在三环外的一栋办公楼里，有另一个未经注册的教会锡安教会，他们也在差不多的场所集会；它的牧师，金明日，毕业于北京大学。和守望教会一样，锡安教会占据了整个楼层，还包括一个书店和咖啡厅，给喝咖啡的人提供积分卡。主会堂能容纳400人，无论外观还是给人的感觉都很像美国的乡村教堂。锡安的牧师同样是不妥协的福音派布道者，但是这家教会未被关闭，因为它在敏感问题的参与上要谨慎的多。

The pastors of both churches (and the leader of Shanghai’s largest house church, before it was closed, like Shouwang, in 2010) are members of China’s 2.3m-strong ethnic Korean minority, who see the Christianisation of South Korea as a model for China to follow. Both pastors came of age during—and took part in the Tiananmen protests of 1989, the crushing of which led to their disillusionment with the party and the spiritual search that led to their conversion. Yet officials in Beijing, so far, feel they can cohabit with one of them at least.

两家教会的牧师（还有上海最大家庭教会的牧师，2010年这家教会和守望一样被关闭了）都是朝鲜族人，而中国的朝鲜族有2,300万人之多。他们认为韩国的基督教化值得中国学习效仿。两名牧师在1989年天安门学运中都已成人，并参与其中，运动的失败让他们对党的理想幻灭，转向精神世界求索，并最终皈依。不过北京的官员到目前为止，觉得他们至少能忍受一个这样教会的存在。

At the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences one man, Liu Peng, is trying to assist the process. Mr Liu recommended a moderate line to defuse the standoff with Shouwang. A certificate in his office confirms that China’s then president, Hu Jintao, acted on his advice; by the standards of crackdowns on dissent, the one on Shouwang church was mild.

中国社会科学院的刘鹏想对此施以援手。刘先生提出一条中间路线来打破守望事件的僵局。他办公室的一份证明文件显示，时任中国国家主席胡锦涛采纳了他的建议；按照镇压异见人士的标准来看，守望教会的组织者属于温和派。

Mr Liu, a Christian himself, is now, on his own initiative, drafting a document that he hopes will become the country’s first law on religion. At present religion is governed only by administrative regulations; such a law might make it more difficult for officials to crack down arbitrarily. Mr Liu says the party should allow its members to be believers, since an age of toleration would benefit the party as well as the churches. There should be a “religious free market”. But he admits that this, like a law, is a long way off.

刘先生本人也是基督信徒，他主动草拟了一份文件，希望可以成为这个国家首部宗教法律。目前，宗教受制于行政法规；一部成文法律的出现将掣住独断镇压的官员们的手脚。刘认为中共应当允许党员信教，因为一个宽容时代的来临不仅有利于教会，也会造福中共自身。应当出现一个“宗教自由市场”，但是他承认这和法律一样，仍旧道阻且长。

Meanwhile, acts of defiance are increasing. A mid-ranking official in a big city was recently told that her Christian faith, which was well known in the office, was not compatible with her party membership and she would have to give it up. She politely told her superiors that she would not be able to do that, and that her freedom of belief was protected by the Chinese constitution. She was not fired, but sent on a remedial course at a party school. She is now back at her job, and says her colleagues often come to her asking for prayer.

与此同时，反抗行为在增多。某大城市的一名中层干部，其基督教信仰在办公室人尽皆知，最近被告知这与她的党员身份不相符，她必须放弃信仰。她礼貌地告诉上级她办不到，以及她的信仰自由是受宪法保护的。该干部并没有被辞退，但是被送入党校接受矫正教育。如今她已回归工作岗位，她说她的同事常常会来找她做祷告。

Christians are becoming more socially (and sometimes politically) engaged, too. Wang Yi is a former law professor and prolific blogger who became a Christian in 2005. The next year he was one of three house-church Christians who met President George W. Bush at the White House. Mr Wang is now pastor of Early Rain, a house church in the south-western city of Chengdu. On June 1st this year, International Children’s Day, he and members of his congregation were detained for distributing leaflets opposing China’s one-child policy and the forced abortions it leads to.

基督教徒的社会参与度（有时是政治参与度）也日趋强化。曾经是一名法律教授的王怡，之后成了一名笔耕不辍的博主，2005年入教。第二年他成为在白宫会面乔治•布什总统的三维家庭教会教徒之一。王现在是秋雨之福教会的牧师，该家庭教会位于西南城市成都。今年六月一日也就是国际儿童节那天，他和教会成员因派发反对中国计划生育政策和强制堕胎的传单被警方拘留。

In 2013 a group of Chinese intellectuals convened a conference in Oxford which brought together, for the first time, thinkers from the New Left, whose members want to retain some of the egalitarian parts of Maoism; the New Confucians, who want to promote more of China’s traditional philosophical thinking; and the New Liberals, classic economic and political liberals. For the first time Christian intellectuals were included as well. The gathering produced a document, called the Oxford Consensus, emphasising that the centre of the Chinese nation is the people, not the state; that culture should be pluralistic; and that China must always behave peacefully towards others. This was not overtly Christian, but it was significant that Christian intellectuals had been included. A summary of the meeting was published in an influential Chinese newspaper, Southern People, and most participants continue to live freely, if cautiously, in China.

2013年，一群中国知识分子在牛津召开会议，首次实现了新左派（其成员希望保留毛泽东思想中的某些平等主义元素）、新儒家（该派希望能够更多地推广中国的传统哲学思想）和新自由派（由古典经济和政治自由主义者组成）共聚一堂。这也是第一次，信仰基督的知识分子也参与其中。本次大会形成了一份文件，《牛津共识》，强调中华民族的核心是人民，不是政权；文化应当多元，中国应当永远与其他国家和平共处。这份宣言并没有公开宣扬基督教义，但是基督教能在其中担当一份子，意义十分重大。关于本次会议的概览发表在中国一份极具影响力的报刊《南方人物周刊》上，绝大多数会议参与者只要小心谨慎，如今仍得以在中国生活，并未失去人身自由。

The paradox, as they all know, is that religious freedom, if it ever takes hold, might harm the Christian church in two ways. The church might become institutionalised, wealthy and hence corrupt, as happened in Rome in the high Middle Ages, and is already happening a little in the businessmen’s churches of Wenzhou. Alternatively the church, long strengthened by repression, may become a feebler part of society in a climate of toleration. As one Beijing house-church elder declared, with a nod to the erosion of Christian faith in western Europe: “If we get full religious freedom, then the church is finished.”

吊诡的是，他们当中每个人都清楚，如果宗教自由真的实现了，也许会从两方面损害基督教会。一是教会可能被体制化，收受钱财，最终腐败，中世纪的罗马就是前车之鉴，温州的商人教会也已初现端倪。另一种情况就是，长期以来愈挫愈强，若社会气候乍变宽和，反而会式微。正如某位北京家庭教会的长老所言，同西欧基督教信仰的衰落一样：“如果我们获得了完全的宗教自由，那么教会也就走到了尽头。

来自群组: ECO中文网